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Teaching the Intelligence Process: The Killing of Bin Laden 
as a Case Study 
Keith Cozine 
St. John's University, cozinek@stjohns.edu 
 
Introduction 
Intelligence is an important component of a variety of other disciplines including Political 
Science, Criminal Justice, and the nascent field of Homeland Security. Unfortunately, 
many academic programs in these fields do not offer courses in intelligence, leaving 
students without a firm understanding of the intelligence process. The case of the killing 
of bin Laden is one that most students from other disciplines are familiar with and is 
unique in its ability to bridge this gap and educate them on the importance of the 
intelligence process.   The clandestine nature of intelligence makes using case studies to 
teach intelligence problematic; however, a large amount of information on the hunt for 
bin Laden and the role of the intelligence process are available from open sources. The 
nature of this case allows for inclusion of a variety of important topics related to the 
intelligence process, such as the roles of various members of the intelligence community, 
various collection methods, as well as the various steps of the intelligence cycle and how 
it can be used against non-state actors.  
 
The historical importance of 2 May 2011, as the end of the two decade long manhunt for 
the World’s most wanted man is undeniable. The death of Osama bin Laden had 
significant benefit in both the fight against global terrorism as well as the psyche of those 
both directly and indirectly affected by al Qaeda attacks. Beyond these strategic and 
psychological benefits; this event, or rather the events leadings up to his demise, have 
given those who teach intelligence a unique opportunity.  These events serve as an 
excellent case study to illustrate the various complex concepts, methods and process 
related to the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence to both students and 
professionals unfamiliar with the topic.  In addition, given the amount of information on 
the intelligence efforts leading up the to the raid on bin Laden’s compound that has 
emerged over the past two years, this case also have value to teach more complex 
concepts such as groupthink, competitive analysis, synergetic relationship of all source 
intelligence, and use of intelligence against non-state actors.    
 
One of the greatest challenges to those tasked with teaching intelligence is the secretive 
nature of the subject.  While, an instructor with a firm grasp of the subject can relate the 
various theories and concepts that form the foundations of intelligence studies, finding 
real world examples that illustrate or support this material can be problematic.  Since the 
collections, analysis and disseminations of intelligence occurs clandestinely, those 
activities most relevant to the issues of the day usually come to light only if there are 
intelligence failures. When intelligence successes do come to light, it is often years or 
even decades later.  This can be extremely problematic when trying to teach intelligence 
to undergraduate students who may only have been in the early grades of primary school 
on 11 September 2001 or have little use for history in a technology driven world. Many 
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students today do not recognize the name Mohammed Atta let alone Francis Gary 
Powers.  While these deficiencies can be overcome when a student is enrolled in a robust 
intelligence or security studies program, this task is not easily accomplished in other 
related programs.  
      
Challenges and Opportunities 
The study of intelligence has relevance across many academic disciplines such as 
political science, international affairs, criminal justice, and the nascent field of homeland 
security to name just a few.  Yet, despite the importance of students of these disciplines 
possessing a strong knowledge of intelligence, many undergraduate programs in these 
fields do not require intelligence studies courses as part of their core curriculum, or even 
offer electives in this area. For example, a 2012 study of the role of intelligence in 
homeland security education found that of the ninety-two homeland security programs 
examined, only 5 percent of the courses offered were intelligence specific, less than 44 
percent program offered any intelligence courses, and only eight of these ninety-two 
programs had at least one intelligence related course as a core requirement.1 As a result, 
the subject of intelligence must be addressed within other courses within the core 
curriculum of these various programs. Unfortunately, many students in these programs 
think of intelligence as nothing more than information that is secret, or relate it to covert 
action or espionage depicted in movies whose main characters are named James Bond or 
Jason Bourne. The challenge becomes, how overcome these perceptions and impress on 
the students that intelligence is actually much more.  Specifically it is information that 
been collected, processed and narrowed to meet specific needs of policy makers, or other 
consumers, to assist in their decision making process. Presenting the events leading up to 
the death of bin Laden through of the lens of the intelligence process is one way in those 
who teach intelligence can meet this challenge. 
 
One of the many aspects about the location and killing of Osama bin Laden that was 
unique was the speed at which information regarding the events leading up to his death 
became available. This phenomenon can be contributed a number of factors.   First, the 
significance of the event created an environment where many of those connected to the 
event wanted their involvement and contributions to be known. This was not limited to 
individuals but also the various agencies involved in the process.  Second, the public, not 
just within the United States, had an insatiable appetite for any information related to the 
event, and the world media aggressively tried to supply any information it could.  Finally, 
the U.S. military had crossed into a foreign nation’s territory to carry out a covert activity 
against a specific individual without that country’s consent.  It was in the U.S. 
Administration’s best interest to release what information it could in order to show not 
just the information it had but also how it was collected and the rigor with which it was 
analyzed.  Within days of his death, details about the raid and the events leading up to it 
found their way into the media.  In the days to the 10th anniversary of the 11 September 
attack numerous documentaries about bin Laden’s death aired, many with that active 
participation of administration members involved in the process of locating bin Laden 
                                                             
1
 Jeffery P. Grossman, “The Role of Intelligence in Homeland Security Education: 
A Brief Study and Commentary, (paper presented at the 8th annual conference of the International 
Association for Intelligence Education, Washington, DC, May 21-24, 2012).  
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and the decision to attack his compound, including the President. In less than two years 
after the raid on the Abbottabad compound, a major motion picture based on the assault 
and the events leading to it was nominated for several Academy Awards.   This wealth of 
information has allowed intelligence educators to provide their students with timely real 
world examples highlighting a success rather than dissecting failures in order teach the 
relevant material in the field.   
 
Using bin Laden’s death as a case study has particular value as an excellent opportunity 
to fill in the knowledge gap related to intelligence in students from other disciplines.  
First, it is a topic that most all students are familiar with regardless of discipline or 
background. The instructor need not worry about dedicating significant time providing 
the back-story or historical relevance of the events.  Next, the case highlights numerous 
issues that can form a strong foundation for a basic understanding of a variety of topics 
necessary to appreciate the complexity of the intelligence process.  Some of these issues 
include: the roles and responsibilities of various members of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC); the concept of collection requirements to meet the consumers’ needs; 
the various collection disciples employed to gather information, the exploitation and 
processing of material into raw intelligence; the analysis and production of intelligence, 
the dissemination of a finished intelligence product; and finally, how feedback from 
policy makers turns the intelligence process into a cycle.2 Third, the events used to 
illustrate the various steps in the intelligence process occur mostly in a clear 
chronological order that allows the material to be presented in a clear and organized 
manner.  Finally, the amount of information available in a variety of open sources allows 
teachers to customize the material to meet their time constraints and students’ needs.   
 
The example below illustrates how a case study of the death of Osama bin Laden was 
used to teach the intelligence process to students who were enrolled in a course where 
intelligence was not the main focus but an important topic within the overall framework 
of the class material.  This particular example was used to explain the intelligence 
process to graduate students enrolled in either the Criminal Justice or Global Affairs 
program at Rutgers University in Newark, NJ. The title of the course was “Modern 
Political Terrorism.” This method was also used to instruct undergraduate students 
enrolled in the Homeland and Corporate Security Program at St. John’s University in 
Queens, NY in a course titled “Terrorism and Emergency Management.” In both courses, 
the material took approximately two hours to deliver and appeared to give the students a 
basic understanding of the intelligence process and the related issues and concepts.3   
 
Policy Makers and Intelligence Requirements 
The hunt for Osama bin Laden highlights many of the challenges of employing the 
intelligence process to achieve strategic goals against non-state actors.  These actors have 
                                                             
2
 While the author recognizes that there are a variety of interpretations of the intelligence cycle, he has 
decided to defer to the version adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/work-of-the-
cia.html.  
3
 This conclusion is based on students’ answers to questions related to the material in course exams and 
other assessments.  
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networks that are fluid and ever changing. Compared to states, whose locations and the 
locations of their strategic assets are much easier to locate and monitor, non-state actors’ 
locations may change often making it difficult to locate or monitor them. The location of 
bin Laden had been a standing collection requirement well before 11 September 2001, 
and a variety of intelligence methods were utilized to try and locate him and to launch an 
operation to capture or kill him. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and bin Laden’s 
subsequent escape from Tora Bora the trail went cold.  The reason for bin Laden’s 
disappearance for nearly a decade was due in no small part to his reliance on a system 
and network of trusted couriers to communicate with the outside world.  Ironically, it was 
this network that, through a synergetic use of all-source intelligence collection 
techniques, and the hard work and dedication of intelligence officials, that bin Laden was 
eventually located and killed.  The key to this success was the identification of bin 
Laden’s most trusted courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.  
 
The identification and location of al-Kuwait is an excellent opportunity to introduce 
students to the concepts and issues related to the collection disciplines of human 
intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT).  The identification of al-
Kuwaiti by al-Qaeda operatives in custody illustrates how valuable intelligence can be 
elicited from human sources.  However, it should be pointed out that HUMINT includes a 
variety of sources, some of which will emerge later in this study. When talking 
specifically about the case of al-Kuwaiti, it is important to note that while several sources 
discuss his importance to al-Qaeda, several key al-Qaeda figures such as Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed and Abu Faraj al Libi claimed that al-Kuwaiti was either no longer with the 
organization or down played his importance.4  Clearly the reliability, credibility, and 
denial and deception are all important topics when dealing with HUMINT that could be 
discussed at this point, so to is the fact that it is often necessary to apply “Gertrude's 
Law” as the forceful denial is often more important than an admission.5  
 
Even after al-Kuwaiti’s importance came to light, it was still several years before he was 
located. The event that led to his identification serves as an excellent example to 
highlight both the role of the National Security Agency (NSA) within the IC and the 
importance and challenges of SIGINT. This event was the interception by the NSA of a 
phone call between a known al-Qaeda sympathizer in the Persian Gulf and an individual 
in northwestern Pakistan.  During the conversation, the man in Pakistan, whom those 
listening believed to be al-Kuwaiti stated, “I’m back with the people I was with before,” 
confirming that he was back working for al-Qaeda.6  While this call is an example of the 
value of SIGINT, the ability to detect and listen in was aided by that fact that several 
phone numbers possibly linked to al-Kuwaiti was provided to the United States by a third 
country.7 This type of intelligence windfall and cooperation does not always occur.  This 
provides an opportunity to discuss the challenge of  “noise versus signals” of SIGINT 
                                                             
4
 Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt, The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad, (New York: 
Crown, 2012), 95-107. 
5
 “Gertrude's Law” is a reference to the character Gertrude in Shakespeare’s Hamlet who is famous for her 
quote “The lady doth protest too much, methinks," 
6
 Bergen, Manhunt, 123. 
7
 Ibid, 122. 
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where the important information is often embedded in a great deal of noise.8 Regardless 
of how the call was intercepted, the event, as one official familiar with the process 
leading up the Abbottabad raid stated, “This is where you start the movie about the hunt 
for bin Laden.”9  It is also the starting point for teaching of intelligence using the bin 
Laden case study to illustrate the intelligence cycle and the importance of feedback to the 
intelligence cycle.  
 
Bin Laden and the Intelligence Cycle 
The Intelligence Cycle begins with planning and directions, and in the case of al-
Kuwaiti, the requirements were to determine if he was a trusted courier for high value al-
Qaeda targets, was one of these target bin-Laden, and could he lead them to his 
locations? In order to answer these questions, a massive collection effort began including: 
HUMINT in the form of sources on the ground, SIGINT and Geospatial Intelligence 
(GEOINT) collected from satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  The 
introduction of GEOINT into the collections fray not only offers the opportunity of 
explaining this collection discipline but also illustrates the use of new collection methods 
such as UAVs.  The result of this all-source approach was that al-Kuwaiti eventually led 
those watching his movements to the compound in Abbottabad, which now also became a 
target of collection efforts.  The information collected on the compound through 
HUMINT, SIGINT and GEOINT was processed and exploited and reveled that this 
compound had no Internet or phone access, twelve-foot high walls, and many of the 
windows blocked out.   When this raw intelligence was analyzed along with other factors 
such as al-Kuwaiti driving miles out of his way to make phone calls or use Internet cafes 
and the residence of the compound burning their trash, the conclusion was made that al-
Kuwaiti is linked to a high value target living in the compound.10 This analysis was 
disseminated to the highest level of government. The feedback received back from policy 
makers was probably best summed up by the words of CIA Director Leon Panetta who 
stated, “I want to know what is going on in that compound.”11  
 
The feedback received from policy makers clearly outlined new planning and directions 
for the next turn through the intelligence cycle; determine the identity of the high value 
target living in Abbottabad compound. Again, a massive collection effort continued to 
focus on the compound from both the sky and the ground. On the ground, the CIA set up 
a safe house in Abbottabad to watch the compound and log all activities they could 
observe without arousing suspicion.  These observations lead to the identification of one 
particular person who stood out because he did not participate in daily chores and rarely 
left the buildings other than short walks on an obscured balcony or in the garden.  This 
individual’s behavior earned him the nickname “the pacer,” and became the center of 
attention as a possible candidate for bin Laden.12  This boots on the ground approach to 
                                                             
8
 Lowenthal, Mark M., Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 75. 
9
 Bob Woodward, “Death of Osama bin Laden: Phone call pointed U.S. to compound — and to ‘the 
pacer’,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2011, available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-
06/world/35232344_1_lines-or-internet-service-abbottabad-osama-bin-laden. 
10
 Smithsonian Channel, The Hunt For Bin Laden, April 29, 2012. 
11
 Bergen, Manhunt, 125.  
12
 History Channel, Targeting Bin Laden, September 6, 2011. 
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collection is important for not just identifying “the pacer;” but also as a teaching tool as it 
highlights another type of HUMINT-case officers carrying out covert in foreign 
countries. Once “the pacer” was identified, he became the focus of collection efforts, 
especially through the use of GEOINT methods.  The photographs and other images were 
processed and exploited by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The 
imagery never provided a clear view of “the pacer’s” face, however the NGA did 
estimate his height was somewhere between 5-foot-8 and 6-foot-8.13  While this did not 
lead to the positive identification of “the pacer” as bin Laden, it does offer an opportunity 
to provide examples of how GEOINT is processed and exploited and the role of the 
NGA. Though the raw intelligence did not specifically identify bin Laden, when 
analyzed, the conclusion was that there was a high probability that “the pacer” was in fact 
bin Laden. When this information was disseminated to policy makers, the feedback that 
was received was that “the pacer’s” identity had to be confirmed before an operation on 
the target could move forward.  
 
Once again the feedback received from policy makers reset the intelligence cycle with 
clearly set planning and direction objectives.  Confirm if “the pacer” was Osama bin 
Laden. In an attempt to meet these collection requirements, The CIA organized a fake 
vaccination program in Abbottabad in an elaborate attempt to obtain DNA from the 
children inside the compound and confirm they were bin Laden’s. The agency recruited a 
senior Pakistani doctor to organize the vaccine drive to gain access to the compound and 
collect DNA samples.14  While the collection efforts were unsuccessful and the doctor 
recruited by the CIA was ultimately arrested, it does offer some important teaching 
points. First, it can be used to introduce another type of HUMINT-intelligence officers 
recruiting foreign nationals to spy or engage in covert activity.  Second, it demonstrates 
the danger that is inherent with the collection efforts.  Finally, it shows that no matter 
how many resources are utilized to clandestinely collect information, or how valuable a 
target may be, operational success is not guaranteed. This is not to say that the operation 
was a complete failure. The information gathered regarding the difficulty of gaining 
access to the compound was processed and forward for analysis.  The result, the security 
precautions being taken at the compound strengthened the likelihood that “the pacer” was 
bin Laden.  The information disseminated to policy makers placed the probably that he 
would be found in the compound at about 60-70 percent.15 Given the potential value of 
the target and the possible fallout of carrying out covert operation in a foreign country, 
was that a high enough probability to order such an operation to get this target? 
 
One final analysis of all the information was conducted by a “Red Team” assembled to 
come up with alternative explanations for the intelligence gathered up until this point.  
This action was taken despite the fact the raw intelligence was already analyzed by the 
CIA for alternate hypotheses.   The reason for this decision was the thought that the 
analysts who had been involved up until this point were too invested in the outcome and 
                                                             
13
 Woodward, “Death of Osama bin Laden.” 
14
 Saeed Shah, “CIA organised fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden's family DNA,” The 
Guardian, July 11, 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-
osama-bin-ladens-dna. 
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 History Channel, Targeting Bin Laden. 
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there was a need for a fresh set of eyes to review the material.  In the end, the “Red 
Team” put the probability of Osama bin Laden being inside the compound at 
approximately 40 -60 percent.16  Despite this downgrade in the probably of bin Laden 
being in the compound, the President still ordered the assault on the compound to go 
ahead, successfully locating and killing the World’s most wanted man.  The fact that a 
“Red Team was assembled allows for important topics to be discussed-the importance of 
a redundant analytical stricture.  In the case of the “Red Team,” how competitive analysis 
works and where having analysts with different backgrounds provide additional 
perspectives can be used to combat the issue of groupthink, or forced consensus.17  
 
As explained above, the case study of the hunt for Osama bin Laden offers a unique 
opportunity to explain the intelligence cycle as it relates to strategic intelligence.  It also 
has value in terms of differentiating between Strategic and Tactical intelligence where 
information is collected, analyzed and disseminated in order to support a particular 
operation.  While strategic collection efforts were attempting to confirm the identity of 
“the pacer,” simultaneously tactical intelligence was being gathered for using in planning 
a potential assault on the compound.  For example, GEOINT collected from the sky was 
combined with HUMINT collected on the ground to determine the best method to launch 
such an assault.  In fact, the information collected was processed and exploited in order to 
build a scale replica of the compound for the assault to be planned and rehearsed. The 
tactical intelligence side of the case also illustrated the value of open source intelligence 
(OSINT) even when dealing with something as sensitive as the location of bin Laden and 
the eventual assault on the compound.  Readily available information including, weather 
reports, maps of Abbottabad, and even information on the phases of the moon all played 
a role in both the strategic and tactical side of this case.  In fact, the value of this case to 
teach a variety of intelligence issues and concepts is limited only by an instructor’s 
imagination and lesson plan.  
 
Conclusion 
Rarely has a case been as timely, tailored, digestible and clear as the hunt for Osama bin 
Laden when it comes to its value on teaching the subject of intelligence.  The amount of 
information related to the events leading up to the raid on the Abbottabad compound 
gives educators a wide array of examples to illustrate many of the complex issues, 
concepts and theories related to collection, processing and analysis of intelligence.   It 
also highlights the way in which the intelligence process and covert activity can be 
utilized against the ever-increasing security threat from non-state actors and the value of 
emerging technology such UAVs on both fronts.  In addition to the amount of open 
source information available on the hunt, the familiarity of both the event and the target 
makes this case especially valuable for teaching intelligence to students in other 
disciplines.  Rather than concerning themselves with giving the back-story, educators can 
concentrate their efforts on the meaning of intelligence and the process of cycling from 
requirements to finished intelligence to aid policy makers in decision making.  
 
                                                             
16
 Bergen, Manhunt, 191-4. 
17
 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 14.  
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The events leading to the death of Osama bin Laden as presented above give educators 
the opportunity to teach; the roles and responsibilities of various members of the IC, the 
concept of collection requirements to meet the consumers’ need, the various collection 
disciples employed to gather information, the exploitation and processing of material into 
raw intelligence, the analysis and production of intelligence, the dissemination of a 
finished intelligence product; and finally, how feedback from policy makers turns the 
intelligence process into a cycle.18 In particular, it highlights how this feedback resets the 
collection requirements in an attempt to fill in the information gaps needed to aid policy 
makers in making more confident decisions.  Finally, and possibly most importantly, 
despite several turns through the intelligence cycle, and the use of competitive analysis 
by both the CIA and an assembled “Red Team,” this case shows how decisions as critical 
as entering into a foreign country to engage in a covert action are often made without a 
definitive certainty of the actual situation.  The goal of intelligence is not to prove a 
situation beyond a reasonable doubt, a term familiar to students in many disciplines 
outside intelligence studies, but rather to provide policy makers with the best possible 
picture of a situation at a particular time.  
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 A copy of the presentation utilized by the author to use this case to teach the intelligence cycle can be 
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